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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to evaluate changes in Japan’s domestic politics and 
welfare policies after the Second World War by comparing them with European 
welfare states. This paper indicates Japan is an exceptional case in Esping-
Andersen’s typology of welfare states. The Japanese political system during the 
regime of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was called a “Developmental 
State”. It contributed on high economic growth in Japan after the Second World 
War.
However, Japan ’s developmental state was dismantled through the 
implementation of structural reform from the 1990s. It resulted in an emerging 
unequal society, and social security costs dramatically increased. Therefore, the 
LDP changed its policy direction to to meet the expansion of social security costs 
and advocated the concept of “medium-size welfare, medium-size national 
burden”. In 2009, regime change occurred and the DPJ government was formed. 
It tried to implement welfarist policies focusing on direct support to individual 
people. Nevertheless, opposition parties, business circles and the mass media 
severely criticised the DPJ for increasing the budget deficit. The DPJ government 
gradually understood the necessity for an increase in the consumption tax in 
order to respond to an “aging society with a falling birthrate” in which social 
security costs were dramatically increasing. The DPJ’s proposed tax system 
reform would increase consumption tax from 5% to 10% by 2015. Also, The DPJ 
advocated the concept of the “Integrated reform of social security and tax” and is 
a very similar idea to that of the LDP.
This paper argues that in Japan political parties have played an important 
role in forming and changing welfare systems. Through their experience of 
government, both the LDP and the DPJ recognise the necessity of a social 
security and welfare policy that can respond to an aging society and the difficulty 
in securing finance for it. As a result, their policies converge in the form of 
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“medium-size welfare, medium-size national burden”.
1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to evaluate changes in Japan’s domestic politics and 
welfare policies after the Second World War by comparing them with European 
welfare states. The structure of this paper is as follows. The paper firstly focuses 
on the Japanese political system during the regime of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) as a “Developmental State”. By using Esping-Andersen’s typology of 
welfare states (1990), this paper indicates that Japan is an exceptional case. A 
developmental state is a different political system from that of European welfare 
states. In a developmental state, private enterprises supply social security and 
welfare policies, which in other countries are provided by the welfare state 
(Gould, 1993). It created high economic growth in Japan after the Second World 
War.
Secondly, this paper describes the process of the dismantling of Japan’s 
developmental state through the implementation of structural reform from the 
1990s. As a result of economic globalisation since the late 1980s, Japanese 
enterprises abolished welfare programmes for employees in order to become more 
globally competitive (Watanabe, 2002). However, structural reform resulted in an 
emerging unequal society. In addition, Japan entered an era of an aging society in 
which social security costs dramatically increased and budget deficits were 
inflated. After the Koizumi government resigned, the LDP’s popularity declined so 
it changed its policy direction from neoliberal policies to social democratic ones. 
The LDP proposed that the consumption tax rate would be raised to 10% in the 
mid-2010s to meet the expansion of social security costs and advocated the 
concept of “medium-size welfare, medium-size national burden” (Yosano, 2010).
Finally, this paper will examine the regime change in 2009 when the DPJ 
government was formed. The DPJ regime was the first Japanese government to 
implement welfarist policies focusing on direct support to individual people. 
Nevertheless, policy-making within the DPJ regime was confused because of a 
revenue shortage, and opposition parties, business circles and the mass media 
severely criticised the DPJ for increasing the budget deficit. The DPJ government 
gradually understood the necessity for an increase in the consumption tax in 
order to respond to an “aging society with a falling birthrate” in which social 
security costs were dramatically increasing. The DPJ’s proposed tax system 
reform would increase consumption tax from 5% to 10% by 2015. Additional 
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revenues from this increase in consumption tax will be used only for social 
security costs. The DPJ’s plan is called the “Integrated reform of social security 
and tax” and is a very similar plan to that of the LDP (Eda, 2012).
This paper argues that in Japan political parties have played an important 
role in forming and changing welfare systems. Through their experience of 
government, both the LDP and the DPJ recognise the necessity of a social 
security and welfare policy that can respond to an aging society and the difficulty 
in securing finance for it. As a result, their policies converge in the form of 
“medium-size welfare, medium-size national burden”.
2. The LDP “Developmental State” and European “Welfare States”
2.1 What are welfare states?: The Esping-Andersen model and Japan
Welfare states are a concept of government where the state plays the primary role 
in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its 
citizens. There are two main characteristics of welfare states. Firstly, welfare 
states encourage the activities of strong trade unions organised by industrial 
sector believing that trade unions can boost workers’ incomes and fundamental 
rights. Secondly, governments obtain revenues from relatively high income tax to 
provide welfare programmes such as medical support, employment, education, 
and social security (Gould, 1993). Esping-Andersen (1990) described three types of 
welfare state: a “Social Democratic model”; a “Christian Democratic model”; and, a 
“Liberalist model”.
The social democratic welfare states provide a high degree of welfare services 
and limit reliance on families and the market, based on the principles of 
universalism and citizenship (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). Social 
democratic models include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden, and their social policies are regarded as “politics against the market” 
(Esping-Andersen 1985). Christian democratic welfare states offer a medium level 
of welfare services and a high degree of social stratification, based on the 
principle of subsidiarity and the dominance of social insurance schemes. Christian 
democratic models include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Italy 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Liberal welfare states ideally only interfere in their 
citizens’ lives to ameliorate poverty and provide for basic needs, based on the 
notion of market dominance and private provision. Australia, Canada, 
Switzerland and the US are examples of liberal welfare states (Ferragina and 
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Seeleib-Kaiser 2011).
Japan is an exceptional case (Rose and Shiratori, 1986; Jones, 1990) called a 
“Developmental State” (Murakami, 1992). The characteristics of a developmental 
state are that the state intervenes in the economic market in order to accomplish 
economic growth. In a developmental state, the government will implement 
industrial policies to foster a particular industry which could contribute to 
economic growth and indirectly bring about stability. The government 
accomplishes an expansion in employment and rises in wages indirectly by 
developing private enterprises. On the other hand, in welfare states, governments 
spend a large amount of their budgets for social security and welfare for 
individual people in order to stabilize national life (Gould, 1993).
The LDP played an important role in creating the developmental state in 
Japan by concentrating on economic growth (Johnson, 1982). It could contribute 
to forming a developmental state through its support bases in both urban and 
rural areas. Firstly, in urban areas, the LDP could obtain the support of 
employees in large enterprises and made coalitions with ministries (Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Economy, Technology, and Industry) and business circles to 
implement industrial policies to support these large enterprises. Japan ’s 
enterprises established a “Japanese style of management” which included the 
seniority system, lifetime employment and enterprise unions; and those 
enterprises also provided welfare programmes for their employees (Dore, 1987). In 
other words, in the Japanese developmental state, enterprises played an 
alternative role to that of welfare states (Yamaguchi, 2005). As is well-known, in 
welfare states inter-company trade unions have strong political power and can 
pressurize governments. As a result, welfare programmes have been provided by 
the state (Abegglen, 1973; Shirai, 1984; Uzuhashi, 1997).
The LDP’s second support base was in rural areas. High economic growth 
brought increases in tax revenues, much of which the government distributed to 
rural areas through public work projects and subsidies (Esteves-Abe, 2008). These 
projects and subsidies resulted in the economic stability of rural areas and as a 
result the LDP could gather more votes. In Japan, the percentage of public work 
programmes in the national budget is high, but the percentage of social security is 
low. In contrast, in welfare states the percentage of public work programmes in 
the national budget is low, but the percentage of social security is high 
(Yamaguchi, 1998).
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2.2 The developmental state and high economic growth
In this section the developmental state and high economic growth is explained. In 
the 1980s, Japanese enterprises became very competitive through the 
implementation of industrial policies. This was a period of “Japan as Number 
One” with three foundations underlying the strong competitiveness of Japanese 
enterprises (Vogel, 1979; Rose, 1985). The first one was a strong labour force. 
Japanese workers were well-known for working hard because in Japan trade 
unions are very weak and as a result there are few labour regulations, unlike in 
welfare states. Several scholars explain how Japanese enterprises can inspire 
their members’ loyalty and commitment by offering lifetime employment and a 
seniority system (Dore, 1987; Aoki, 1988; Muramatsu, 1994; Noguchi, 1995) and 
welfare services such as corporate housing and family benefits. Employees in 
Japanese enterprises heavily depend on internal welfare schemes and companies 
could increase their competitiveness at the expense of employees, some of whom 
may even die from overwork (Motojima, 1982; Dore, 1987). Despite this, many 
employees became disinterested in public welfare programmes to the extent that 
social democratic parties, such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), lost popularity 
(Miura, 2012). Instead, employees supported the LDP and trade unions which 
tended to cooperate with enterprises (Gould, 1993; Inagami and Whittaker, 2005).
Secondly, Japanese enterprises had strong networks of subcontractors and 
affiliated companies which efficiently supplied high quality, cheap components to 
the large companies, such as through Toyota’s “Just in Time” system (Armstrong, 
Glyn, and Harrison, 1991). A third important foundation was the LDP’s “pork-
barrel” politics which implemented public work programmes, subsidies and 
taxation incentives for enterprises to earn the support of rural voters. These 
policies and programmes could protect less competitive industries in rural areas 
such as agriculture (Miyamoto, 1999). These three foundations resulted in social 
stability in Japan which contributed to high economic growth.
3. Structural Reform: Dismantling of the Developmental State
3.1 From the 1970s: Dismantling of European welfare states
Firstly, I would like to discuss the dismantling of European welfare states from 
the 1970s. Structural reform became a key political issues for the governments of 
G7and OECD countries. Its purpose was to reshape the management of public 
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spending (Wright, 2002). In particular, in both the UK and the US, conservative 
governments pledged to implement monetarism and supply side economics, 
reducing welfare provision and increasing the role of the voluntary and 
commercial sectors (Mukawa, 1992). In other words, conservative governments 
regarded the welfare state as an “enemy” of sound public finance and economic 
growth and attacked trade unions and social democratic parties.
3.2 The start of Japan’s structural reform
In Japan, even though structural reform has been an important political issue 
since the 1970s, reform plans did not progress in the 1970s or 1980s because 
Japanese enterprises were strongly competitive. For example, Toyota and Nissan 
surpassed the US’s “Big Three” and structural reform did not seem to be needed. 
However, in the late 1980s, Japanese enterprises confronted globalisation and 
faced the appreciation of the yen and economic friction (Miura, 2012). In addition, 
the Cold War ended in 1990 and competition among transnational companies 
increased. As a result, Japanese enterprises passively started to accelerate 
overseas development and business circles and companies wanted the LDP to 
implement structural reform (Curtis, 1988; Watanabe, 2004).
Business circles argued that a developmental state diminished the 
competitiveness of Japanese enterprises and that reforms were required. Firstly, 
Japanese enterprises started to reform the seniority system and lifetime 
employment. They argued that the labour market had lost flexibility and the cost 
competitiveness of enterprises was weakened because of these two practices 
(Miura, 2012). Secondly, they criticised the LDP’s pork-barrel politics because it 
inflated budget deficits and increased rates of corporate tax. Subsidies, protective 
policies, and public works programmes also protected less competitive industries 
such as agriculture which dampened the competitiveness of transnational 
companies (Watanabe, 2004). Thirdly, in order to remain cost competitive, Japan’s 
larger companies started to abolish their welfare programmes; Japan’s society 
was rapidly aging and the cost of welfare programmes had dramatically increased 
(Goto, 2001).
3.3 Japan’s structural reform
Since the 1990s, several governments such as the Hashimoto (1996-8) and the 
Koizumi governments (2001-5) have tried to implement structural reform. First, 
they tried to decrease public works projects and subsidies for rural areas in order 
to accomplish fiscal structural reform. This resulted in a shakeout of less 
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competitive industries and a reinforcement of larger companies’ competitiveness 
through a reduction of the costs of raw materials and distribution. For example, 
the Hashimoto government abolished the Food Control Act as the first step in the 
liberalisation of rice imports. Another example is the abolition of the Act for the 
Adjustment of Retail Business Operations in Large Scale Retail Stores which had 
protected retail dealers (Watanabe, 2009).
Secondly, they pushed forward deregulation in order to increase freedom for 
business activities. They abolished several protection policies, which had 
previously guaranteed the rights of large companies, in order to open domestic 
markets in compensation for the expansion of Japanese companies overseas. 
These changes included the settlement of non-performing loans; the liberalisation 
of the financial industry; the liberalisation of the telecommunications market; 
and, the deregulation of labour markets (Miura, 2012).
Lifetime employment and the seniority system were also reformed. In these 
systems, workers who join a company in the same year compete strongly with 
each other; however, until they reach very senior levels they are promoted at the 
same speed. This resulted in Japanese enterprises being very competitive during 
an era of high-speed growth, but in a global economy in which production bases 
were transferred to Asian regions with abundant cheap labour Japanese 
enterprises lost competitiveness. The reason for this is that rigidities in the labour 
market deprive them of flexibility in their activities and they needed to 
implement measures to rectify high-cost structures, such as corporate downsizing 
(Weather, 2004).
Thirdly, they tackled fiscal structural reform to reduce budgets for education, 
social security and health care. The purpose of the reform was to reduce the 
burden of corporate tax to aid Japanese enterprises’ competitiveness. On the other 
hand, in 1990, the Takashita government had to impose a “consumption tax” as an 
alternative to corporate tax (Kato, 1997).
3.4 Dismantling of the developmental state and the collapse of Japanese society
As a result of structural reform, transnational companies’ performance recovered. 
However, in Japan, there were unique phenomena which were not seen in 
European welfare states. Until the 1990s, the unemployment rate in Japan was 
relatively low among democratic nations; however, in the 1990s large companies 
tried to revise the Japanese style employment system by decreasing the new 
recruitment of regular employers. The unemployment rate was 2.1% in 1991 but 
increased to 5.4% in 2002 and unemployment rates of people under 30 years old 
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particularly increased (Naikakufu, 2003). There were 15 million non-regular 
young workers, which was a third of total employees in Japan (Iwata, 2000).
Moreover, this resulted in a rapid rise of serious social problems, such as a 
dramatic increase in suicide rates, an expansion of poverty and an increase in 
households with no savings, increases in child abuse and atrocious crimes, and 
increases in bankruptcy (Keisatsuchou ed., 2003). The reason for this was that in 
Japan there was no foundation for the state to provide social security and welfare, 
unlike in welfare states (Pinker, 1986). Japanese society could not provide 
sufficient social security when the developmental state was dismantled.
3.5 LDP’s policy change after the Koizumi government’s resignation
Within the Koizumi government, several ministers and LDP executives 
recognised the seriousness of Japan’s social problems. After Koizumi won a 
landslide victory in the 2005 general election, he lifted a ban on discussing 
consumption tax increases. After the Koizumi government resigned in 2006, the 
LDP Research Committee on Tax System (RCTS) proposed that the tax system 
should include “reform of both expenditure and revenue” (Yosano, 2010). In the 
process of proposing to reform expenditure and revenue, the LDP first advocated 
the concept of “Tax for social security”. This meant a rise in consumption tax to 
cover the costs of social security, such as pensions, medical services and nursing 
care (Shimizu, 2005).
In 2007, the Fukuda government proposed that the consumption tax rate 
would be raised to 10% in the mid-2010s. The government calculated that an 
increase to 10% would meet the expansion of social security costs. Similarly, in 
2008 the Aso government advocated the concept of “medium-size welfare, 
medium-size national burden” (Yosano, 2010; Shimizu, 2005).
4. Regime Change: The DPJ Regime is Formed.
4.1 What is the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)?
The DPJ was established in 1996 and was called a “motley collection of different 
factions” (Shiota, 2009). It consisted of the former Japan New Party (JNP) and the 
Sakigake group, the former SPJ group, and the former New Frontier Party (a 
former DSP group and a former LDP group) (Takenaka, 2005). The objective of 
forming the DPJ was to compete with the LDP which had pursued a 
developmental state. The DPJ was a party to drive structural reform through 
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neoliberal policies; its catchwords at its formation included: “From the public to 
the private sector”, “deregulation” and “conquer pork-barrel politics” (Nakano, 
1998).  
4.2 DPJ factions and policy directions
In this section the DPJ’s factions and policy directions are introduced. There are 
three different policy directions within the DPJ. The first policy direction is that 
of “Neoliberal” which pursues an anti-developmental state, anti-LDP pork-barrel 
politics, and anti-bureaucrat-led politics (Uekami and Tsutsumi, 2011). Fiscal 
structural reform is the most important policy and is the most important force of 
the DPJ government with many factions preferring neoliberal policies (Shiota, 
2007; Ito, 2008). The Yukio Hatoyama faction has approximately 45 members. It 
consists of the former Sakigake group (Japan New Party) and the former DSP 
group (the former Shinshinto left wing). The Katsuya Okada faction has 22 
members of the former Shinshinto right wing (those who split from the LDP and 
then left Ichiro Ozawa). The Seiji Maehara and Yoshihiko Noda faction has 
approximately 60 members of the former Japan New Party and Sakigake group 
(Uekami and Tsutsumi, 2011).
The second policy direction is that pursued by the Ozawa group which 
consists of the former Liberal Party and Isshinkai (Ozawa, 1993; Nonaka, 2008). 
Ozawa was an executive in the LDP who left in 1993. This group originally 
belonged to the Tanaka and Takeshita faction in the LDP, which preferred a 
traditional distribution policy. However, they realised the limitations of the LDP’s 
traditional policies, such as an expansionary fiscal policy and a focus on local 
regions. Ozawa created and broke up several small- and medium-sized parties in 
the 1990s. Ozawa firstly made Shinshinto, but after it collapsed he formed the 
Liberal Party and made a coalition with the LDP. But the Liberal Party left the 
coalition and divided in to the New Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. 
Finally the Liberal Party merged with the DPJ. It is interesting that the Ozawa 
group changed its policy direction from new liberal to social democratic and so 
Ozawa is sometimes criticised as being “opportunistic”. After the general election 
in 2009, the members of the Ozawa group dramatically increased from 40 to 120. 
Ozawa basically uses the political methods of the developmental state; however, 
they do not provide subsidies and public work programmes to enterprises, but 
directly provide welfare programmes to individual people, such as the “Individual 
farmers’ income indemnity” (Nonaka, 2008).
The third policy direction of the DPJ is that of “Liberal Policies”. The DPJ 
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criticised the LDP developmental state as an impediment to the progress of civil 
society in Japan. Amongst other things the DPJ promoted decentralisation, 
accountability, and the liberalisation of education. The former SDP group and 
Civic Movement group tried to implement these policies. The leader was Naoto 
Kan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for National Strategy at that 
time. Kan’s contribution to Japanese politics was that he tried to develop civic 
movements to be one of the main actors in Japanese politics. The Hiraoka and 
Kondo group is one that has attracted many young left-wing politicians (Uekami 
and Tsutsumi, 2011).
The DPJ support base consists of the middle class in urban areas, business 
people in large enterprises and executive officers. In elections, the DPJ is strongly 
supported in larger cities and prefectural capitals. Traditionally, urban areas 
could not benefit so much from the LDP regime. Businesses could obtain benefits 
from the recovering competitiveness of transnational companies; therefore, they 
supported the DPJ’s neoliberal policies. On the other hand, the DPJ’s liberal 
policies were supported by citizens (Watanabe, 2009).
4.3 DPJ’s policy change: From neoliberal to welfarist policies
As has been mentioned, in the 1990s the LDP started to implement structural 
reform. The DPJ gradually changed its policies from neoliberal to welfarist ones, 
such as health care, welfare, agriculture, education, and child care. For instance, 
with regard to child care policy, the DPJ’s philosophy changed from “introducing 
competition” to “economic support for child care”. The purpose of the DPJ’s child 
care policy was to relieve the financial burden for child care through payments of 
assistance for child care such as the Kodomo Teate law, budget increases for child 
care, and free tuition fees for public high schools. Another example is that of 
agricultural policy. Traditionally, the LDP gave subsidies to the main agricultural 
organisation called Nokyo (Hisatomi, 1995; Watanabe, 2002) but the DPJ 
presented a policy called the “Individual farmers’ income indemnity” which 
directly provided funds to individual farmers. It can be seen that the DPJ tries to 
support individuals directly, while the LDP indirectly supports individuals via 
enterprises.
The DPJ has also had consistent policies from the establishment of the party 
which can be expressed as the “DPJ concept of state system”. Decentralisation is 
one of these core policies in which the DPJ argued that the central government’s 
public works programmes and subsidies for rural areas were wasteful. Therefore, 
the DPJ has pursued the financial independence of local governments, 
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introducing the concepts of a “municipal merger” and a “regional system” 
(Democratic Party of Japan, 2005). The DPJ has also pursued reform of the 
governing system advocating “political initiatives”. Political initiatives imply 
expanding the Prime Minister’s authority, expanding the Cabinet’s ability to 
initiate budget-making and expanding politicians ’ initiatives within the 
bureaucracy. The DPJ established a “National Strategy Bureau” and “Government 
Revitalization Unit” to reinforce the Cabinet Office’s power. In addition, the DPJ 
claimed the necessity of “small government” arguing for a reduction in civil 
service personnel expenses by 20%. The DPJ also had a reform plan for the 
National Diet, including a reduction of Diet seats and electoral system reform. 
The DPJ prefers the British Westminster system and the establishment of a “two 
party system” (Watanabe, 2009).
4.4 The DPJ manifesto for the 2009 general election
In the 2009 general election, the DPJ presented a manifesto with “five principles” 
to defeat the LDP’s developmental state and implement anti-structural reform. 
The first principle is to move from bureaucrat-led politics to politician-led politics. 
The second is to form a dual system of policy-making shared by the ruling party 
and the cabinet to unify policy-making in the cabinet. Thirdly, the DPJ will not 
try to realise a Ministry’s interest but the National interest. Fourthly, the DPJ 
will change Japanese society from a hierarchical society to a horizontal one. 
Finally, the DPJ will pursue decentralisation. The DPJ received two types of 
support: that for an anti-developmental state and that for anti-structural reform, 
and as a result regime change was realised in 2009 (Tsutsumi and Uekami, 2011).
4.5 Criticism of DPJ policies
The DPJ was successful in realising regime change in 2009; however, the DPJ’s 
policies were severely criticised by opposition parties, business circles and the 
mass media. The most serious problem was that of revenue shortage. It can be 
pointed out that the DPJ regime was the first Japanese government after the 
Second World War to present welfarist policies (Miura, 2012). The DPJ focused on 
direct support to individual people through such measures as the “Kodomo Teate” 
law, “Free tuition fees for public high schools”, and the “Individual farmers’ 
income indemnity”. However, opposition parties, business circles and the mass 
media argued that the implementation of DPJ policies would result in fiscal and 
economic collapse.１）
There was also conflict between groups within the DPJ over fiscal 
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reconstruction and policy implementation. The Ministry of Finance pursued a 
reduction of expenditure to recover fiscal discipline in addition to the DPJ’s own 
establishment of the Government Revitalization Unit to tackle a reduction of 
expenditure focusing on welfare, education and agriculture policies. Prime 
Minister Kan supported MOF and argued the necessity of raising the 
consumption tax rate but the Ozawa group wanted to realise its demands in rural 
areas. Young and middle class groups tried to implement welfarist policies 
(Watanabe, 2009).
In addition, there were several contradictions between policies and manifesto 
promises. For example, the DPJ criticised the developmental state and 
bureaucrat-led politics and tried to reduce civil service personnel expenses by 
20%. This resulted in the curtailing of welfare policies and a reduction in the 
number of civil servants who were implementing those policies. However, in the 
2009 manifesto, the DPJ had promised to expand public administration for 
welfare and education, and in order to accomplish these policies the DPJ claimed 
it would increase the number of civil servants. This is a clear contradiction 
between the policy and the manifesto promise (Watanabe, 2009).
The DPJ had no unified political blueprint, or in other words, the DPJ only 
had the goal of destroying the LDP’s developmental state. However, the DPJ did 
not have any image of what the state should be like after dismantling the LDP’s 
developmental state. There was a contradiction between individual welfarist 
policies, fiscal reconstruction, and neoliberal policies (Watanabe, 2009). The DPJ 
regime could not counter the criticism from opposition parties, mass media and 
business circles and as a result there was no orderly policy-making process within 
the DPJ.
4.6 DPJ tax system reform
This paper argues that the DPJ government was successful in realising tax 
system reform even though the policy-making process for other policies was in a 
state of disorder. The reason for this is that several DPJ politicians, such as 
Hirohisa Fujii and Naoki Minezaki, had a close relationship with MOF. In the 
Hatoyama government, Fujii was appointed as Finance Minister and Minezaki 
became Vice Finance Minister. They argued for the necessity of an increase in 
consumption tax for social security (Gekkan “Zeiri” Henshuu Kyoku ed., 2009). 
This was very similar to the ideas of the LDP. It can also be pointed out that MOF 
and the DPJ also shared similar ideas about the direction of tax system reform 
when the Hatoyama government was formed in September 2009.
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The Hatoyama government tried to restructure the Government Research 
Commission on Tax System (RCTS). Membership of the new government RCTS 
was made up as follows: the chair was the Finance Minister, and the Vice Minister 
of Finance and the Vice Minister of Internal Affairs became vice chairs; other 
committee members consisted of other Vice Ministers.２） During the LDP regime, 
the government RCTS was just an advisory council made up of academics and 
industry representatives and was not an organisation set up for decision-making. 
That authority was held by the LDP RCTS.
The DPJ government established a “Committee of 11 Tax Experts” in the 
government RCTS.３） The purpose of the committee was to provide expert advice 
to the RCTS. Four members of the committee had been members of the 
government RCTS during the LDP regime. This indicates that the DPJ 
government tried to secure a continuity of tax system reform between the LDP 
and DPJ regimes. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the RCTS in 
the DPJ was abolished in order to block the activities of DPJ zoku-giin tax experts 
who only represented the interests of particular industries.４）
Within the DPJ there were also anti-MOF politicians, such as Edano 
Maehara, who were called “new breed policy makers”. However, they gradually 
changed their policy direction to support MOF because MOF persuaded them 
behind the scenes (Eda, 2012). In January 2011, Hatoyama’s successor, Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan, reshuffled the cabinet and appointed Kaoru Yosano, a former 
LDP executive, as minister in charge of economic and fiscal policy.５） He joined the 
discussion on tax and social security reform in the Government RCTS introducing 
a reform plan which was very similar to the previous LDP plan.
The DPJ’s tax system reform plan was called the “Integrated reform of social 
security and tax”. As has been mentioned, Japan is now an aging society with a 
falling birthrate and social security costs are dramatically increasing.６）Therefore, 
the government could consider two policy measures: controlling the rise in social 
security costs and examining how to secure sources of revenue to cover those 
costs. It is widely recognised that it was necessary to implement both reform of 
the tax system and the social security system. In the DPJ’s proposed tax system 
reform consumption tax will increase from 5% to 10% by 2015. Additional 
revenues from this increase in consumption tax will be used only for social 
security costs. This reform plan is very similar to the LDP’s one. The DPJ did 
include a more radical reform plan for the social security system in its 2009 
election manifesto but this was postponed.７）
In 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda faced several difficulties including 
68
KAMIKUBO Masato
the opposition he faces from within the DPJ such as that from the 100 members 
of the Ozawa Group.８） However, the DPJ and opposition parties such as the LDP 
and Komeito have reached a consensus on the need for an increase in 
consumption tax from 5% to 10%, even though the DPJ and opposition parties 
strongly disputed the main policies of the DPJ 2009 manifesto.９） The LDP’s 
original reform plan for tax and social security systems is very similar to the DPJ 
plan (Shimizu, 2005; Yosano, 2010). In fact, the LDP had pledged an increase to a 
10% consumption tax rate in the 2010 House of Councillors Election. The LDP 
also promised to raise the consumption tax rate to 10% in their manifesto for the 
next general election. Komeito has declared that tax reform is not a point of issue 
for them. The DPJ could overcome opposition within its own ranks and the 
consumption tax hike was realised in September 2012.10）
5. Conclusion
This paper has evaluated changes in Japan’s domestic politics and welfare 
policies after regime change in 2009 by comparing them with European welfare 
states. This paper explained how the LDP’s “developmental state” is different 
from Espine-Andersen’s three types of “welfare states”. The LDP’s developmental 
state accomplished high economic growth in the 1980s and private enterprises 
provided social security and welfare to employees. However, in the late 1980s, 
Japan faced increasing global economic competition. Japanese enterprises 
abolished welfare programmes for employees to become more globally competitive. 
In order to respond to trends of liberalisation and deregulation in world markets, 
the LDP implemented “structural reform” in order to dismantle the 
developmental state. As a result, many problems in society occurred because the 
provision of social security by Japanese enterprises decreased. Japan was faced 
with a dramatic increase in the number of suicides, an expansion of poverty and 
an increase in the number of households with no savings, increases in child abuse 
and various atrocious crimes, and increases in unemployment and bankruptcy.
After the Koizumi government resigned in 2006, the LDP changed its policy 
direction to respond to these serious social problems. The LDP decided to increase 
the consumption tax to cover the costs of social security, such as pensions, medical 
services, and nursing care. In doing so the LDP government advocated the concept 
of “medium-size welfare, medium-size national burden”.
In 2009, the DPJ successfully attracted support for an anti-developmental 
state in urban areas and anti-structural reform in rural areas and accomplished 
69
Japan’s Political Parties and Changes in Welfare Policies
regime change. The DPJ government was the first regime to present welfarist 
policies in order to recover from societal collapse. These included the “Kodomo 
Teate” law, “Free tuition fees for public high schools”, and “Individual farmers’ 
income indemnity”. However, the DPJ’s welfarist policy was severely criticised by 
opposition parties, business circles, and the mass media. The DPJ could not 
present coherent counterarguments to the criticisms because within the DPJ 
there were three different policy directions: neoliberal, developmental state, and 
welfare state.
Nevertheless, the DPJ gradually understood the necessity for an increase in 
the consumption tax in order to respond to an “aging society with a falling 
birthrate” in which social security costs were dramatically increasing. Pro-MOF 
politicians in the DPJ led to propose a consumption tax hike from 5% to 10% by 
2015. They decided that additional revenues from this increase in consumption 
tax would be used only for social security costs and cooperated with opposition 
parties such as the LDP in order to overcome resistance within the DPJ. 
Consequently, both the LDP and the DPJ shared a consensus that fiscal 
structural reform to cover expanding social security costs was necessary. This 
paper argues that political parties have contributed to developing the welfare 
system in Japan.
Notes
１）Nihon Keizai Shinbun 6 April, 2012
２）“The Tax Commission”, Cabinet Office, the Government of Japan. http://www.cao.go.jp/zei-
cho/index.html, accessed on 25 February, 2012.
３）Loc. cit.
４）Yomiuri Shinbun 26 August, 2009.
５）Asahi Shinbun 14 January, 2011.
６）“Zeito Shakaihoshou no Ittaikaikaku no Gaiyou”, Ministry of Finance website. http://www.
mof.go.jp/about_mof/councils/fiscal_system_council/sub-of_fiscal_system/proceedings/
material/zaiseia230725/01_1.pdf, accessed on 25 February, 2012.
７）Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2 April, 2012.
８）Asahi Shinbun 2 September, 2011.
９）Nihon Keizai Shinbun 10 June, 2012.
10）Asahi Shinbun 10 September, 2012.
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